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The four so-called "cohesion" countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) 
include economies with the highest rate of unemployment (Spain), an above 
average rate (Ireland), and one of the lowest rates (Portugal). But the rate of 
unemployment is not always a good proxy for the true nature and magnitude of 
the labour market problems and developmental challenges that these countries 
face in a post Single Market Europe.
We survey briefly the macroeconomic context and the key stylised facts of the 
four "cohesion” countries and examine the extent to which the existing 
econometric research literature presents a useful input to the preparation of 
policies designed to address labour market and competitiveness problems. We 
also describe the HERMIN model, which was designed to provide a uniform 
framework for use in the periphery.
We then explore the relevance of the European Commission's 1993 White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment, and suggest that a rather different 
policy focus may be required when moving from the core to the periphery of the 
EU. We conclude with an outline of the types of macro-policy issues that arise in 























































































































































































At the time of the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1956, the (then) EEC consisted 
of six member states that were reasonably homogeneous in terms of GDP per 
capita.1 2 The first enlargement of the EEC in 1972 brought in as new members two 
wealthy core countries (the United Kingdom and Denmark) and one less 
developed peripheral country (Ireland). However, it was not until after the second 
enlargement in 1981 (Greece) and the third in 1986 (Portugal and Spain) that the 
issue of economic and social heterogeneity and regional inequality moved up 
nearer to the top of the EC policy agenda.3 The 1992 Single European Market 
initiative put further pressure on the quest for policies that would help offset some 
of the tendencies towards divergence on the part of the periphery, although these 
issues were not addressed directly at that time in the major research programme 
that examined the probable consequences of the completion of the internal market 
[Cecchini (1988); Emerson et al (1988)].4
The increased concern for economic and social homogeneity in the EC (cohesion) 
resulted in a reformulation and expansion of the disparate group of policies aimed 
at structural and growth objectives under the title Community Support Framework 
(CSF). Policies grouped together included the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund, and the Guidance Section of the very large 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) of aids and support to agriculture.5 In 
terms of their size and wide scope, the CSF policies are of crucial importance to
1 Acknowledgements: This paper draws on the results of research carried out for the 
European Commission, D.G. XII, under contract JOU2-CT92-0257 and for D.G. XV under 
contract ETD/95/B5-3000/MI/86. Our understanding of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish 
economies benefited greatly from discussions with Nicos Christodoulakis, Leonor Modesto, 
Jose Antonio fierce and Simon Sosvilla-Rivero. Errors, omissions and misinterpretations are 
our own responsibility.
2In 1960 the index of GDP per capita (in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), where the 
EC average was 100) ranged narrowly from a low of 86.5 for Italy to a high of 118.6 for the 
Netherlands (ignoring Luxembourg's 158.5)). The regional problems of the mezzogiomo in 
Italy were the one serious exception to homogeneity. At that time, non-members Portugal and 
Greece stood close to 40 [C.E.C. (1993e)].
’in what follows, when we use the term "periphery" we will be referring to Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, unless otherwise qualified.
"Explicit calculations of the 1992 effects were carried out using models of only five countries 
(Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Belgium). The effects of 1992 on the EUR 
12 was on the basis of extrapolation of the weighted average of these five countries [Emerson 
(1988), pp. 262-264],




























































































the three smaller "Objective 1" countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), and, to a 
lesser extent, to the other assisted regions - particularly in Spain, Italy and the 
United Kingdom.
The implementation of the first CSF (Delors-1) covered the five-year period 
1989-93. Moves towards economic and monetary union (EMU) and the signing 
of the Maastricht treaty in December 1992, under which many of the remaining 
areas of policy autonomy in the periphery are likely to be further constrained, 
were accompanied by another expansion of the size and scope of the CSF by 
some 50%. This second programme (Delors-II) will ran for the six-year period 
1994-99.
From the start of the CSF process, the clear aim was to encourage development 
and self sustaining growth in the less developed countries and regions, rather than 
to provide demand stimulus or income maintenance on a continuing basis. From a 
purely economic point of view, the CSF initiatives were seen as the means of 
providing the poorer member states and regions with a window of opportunity to 
rectify economic problems that were associated with their low level of income per 
capita, low rates of productivity and high unemployment and under-employment. 
Hence, the CSF funding was targeted at boosting productive capacity, 
employment and productivity in order to ease transition to the more competitive 
post-1992, post-EMU environment.
The almost certain absence for the foreseeable future of inter-national income 
transfers (i.e., the likelihood of an EU budget that remains small in comparison to 
the much bigger purely national redistributive budgets), has political implications 
for the future of intra-EU aid programmes.6 However, the lessons to be learned 
from the Mezzogiomo experience in Italy are not encouraging and suggest that 
the narrower structural and developmental role for EU aid policies (such as the 
CSF) is perhaps necessary if there is to be any chance of producing the intended 
self-sustaining growth effects within the context of relatively modest budget 
allocations, and within a reasonable length of time (C.E.C. (1993d)).
It is against the above background that we must evaluate the relevance of the 
European Commission’s White Paper Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. Its 
publication in 1993 was motivated by a concern with adverse developments in 
unemployment throughout the EU. By focusing purely on the periphery, our paper 
attempts to rectify the understandable orientation of the White Paper towards the 
preoccupations of the more advanced and developed core EU economies. 
Although the existing periphery is only a small part of the total EU economy -
“Even the relatively modest proposals of the MacDougall Report, where the EU budget would 




























































































generating under 11% of its aggregate GDP in the year 1993, but containing 
almost 19% of total EU population - its problems are similar to, though not at all 
as serious as, those arising in the transition of the newly liberalised Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) economies. Hence, our insights can be generalised to a 
wider peripheral issue that will undoubtedly come to preoccupy the 
soon-to-be-enlarged EU during coming decades.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some general aspects 
of the economics of peripherality, concentrating on the four “cohesion” countries: 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In Section 3 we narrow our focus to labour 
market issues, including institutional arrangements. In Section 4 we review what 
the rather limited econometric literature has to say about the behaviour of issues 
related to the labour markets in the periphery, starting with the aggregate 
approach associated with the seminal work of Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 
1991, and then moving to more sectorally disaggregated studies. In Section 5 we 
describe HERMIN, a four-sector macro model designed to explore issues in the 
periphery within a common framework. In Section 6 we examine the relevance of 
the policy recommendations contained in the White Paper in the light of the 
special characteristics of the peripheral member states. Section 7 concludes.
2. The EU Periphery: Background Economic Issues7
Our purpose in this section is to describe some of the similarities in economic 
structure that characterise the peripheral EU countries - Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain - and to analyse the structural changes that have taken place in these 
countries since they joined the EU.
We begin by looking at the convergence experience of the periphery (i.e. the 
extent to which these regions have caught up with the core in terms of GDP per 
capita). Although some convergence has occurred, these countries remain the 
poorest in the Union and it is not surprising therefore that they share many 
characteristics. Some of these are more apparent than others; the relative 
importance of agriculture and the underdevelopment of physical infrastructure, for 
example. Less obvious, however, are features such as the extent of 
unemployment and underemployment; the relative share of producer and 
consumer services, and the relative lack of increasing-retums-to-scale segments 
of manufacturing industry.




























































































We use the term ‘EU periphery’ to denote those countries all or many of whose 
regions have ‘Objective 1’ status. These regions, with 75% or less of the EU 
average GDP per capita at the time of design of the CSF, essentially comprise the 
western and southern seaboards of the Union.
2.1 The convergence experience of the EU periphery
Has the periphery, thus defined, been converging on the richer regions, in terms 
of GDP per head, or not? The conventional wisdom in economic growth theory is 
that regions should converge over time. The world data (depicted in Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) for example), however, shows divergence rather than 
convergence. These authors and many others argue, however, that when the stock 
of human capital is controlled for, conditional convergence appears.
Walsh (1993) and O'Grada and O'Rourke (1994) control for this, though, and still 
find Ireland to be a slow-growth outlier in terms of European convergence. 
Prados et al. (1993) report similar findings for the whole European periphery. 
Many of these findings however depend strongly on the time period of the 
sample. Table 2.1 takes a broad look at the convergence experience and indicates 
fairly rapid convergence since the mid 1980s for Ireland and Portugal, less rapid 
convergence for Spain, and a tendency towards divergence for Greece.
Table 2.1: Relative GDP (GNP) per capita (EU15 =100)“ (PPS)b
I960 1973 1980 1985 1990 1993 1996
Ire la n d 60.3 (62) 59.8 (59) 63.3 (62) 64.8(58) 71.0 (62) 80.2 (69) 93.8(81.8)
Spain 57.2 75.1 70.7 69.8 74.5 77.8 76.7
G reece 42.6 62.7 64.0 62.4 58.4 64.5 64.5
P ortugal 39.4 57.3 54.8 53.1 59.2 69.1 70.4
' 1960-90 including West Germany; 1991-96 including Germany
1 GDP is measured in terms of its own purchasing power parity._____________
Source; Table 9; European Commission Statistical Annex (1996)
Irish GNP figures came from European Commission Annual Report (1994)
Using Barro and Sala-i-Martin's average convergence speed (2% p.a.), Ireland 
and Portugal appear to have performed quite well (in terms of GDP per head) 
since their respective accessions to the EU in 1973 and 1986.8 This may be partly 
attributable to the CSF programmes, though there is some empirical evidence that 
trade integration also promotes convergence (Ben David, 1993). In the cases of
“Note that there is controversy in Ireland over the accuracy of recent GDP figures, many 





























































































Spain and Greece, however, growth in living standards using this measure 
appears to be very slow. In all cases, with the exception of Ireland, there appears 
to have been zero growth in living standards during the period 1993 to 1996 in 
the cohesion countries.
If living standards are more accurately measured by private consumption per 
capita, as shown in Table 2.2, relative living standards are found to have risen in 
all the countries under study with the exception of Spain between 1973 and 1991 
where, by this definition, living standards remained at a relatively high level. 
During the period 1991 to 1996 convergence continued for all these countries 
except Spain, which actually diverged slightly from the EU average over the 
period.9 Again, this improvement could be linked to CSF expenditures in these 
countries. The convergence experience using these broad indicators is therefore 
ambiguous, and it is necessary to look at the structural differences between core 
and periphery and to ask whether the two groups of regions have been becoming 
more similar in these respects or not.
Table 2.2: Economic Indicators in the Periphery
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU 15a
Unemployment Rate (%)
1960 6.1 5.8 1.8 2.4 2.4
1973 2.0 6.2 2.6 2.6 2.6
1983 7.1 14.0 7.8 17.5 9.1
1993 8.6 15.7 5.7 22.8 10.9
1996 9.1 13.5 7.4 22.5 11.0
Private Consumption/Capita (PPS)b
1960 57.2 76.1 45.9 63.6 100
1973 69.6 64.9 61.9 80.9 100
1991 72.4 71.3 67.1 80.1 100
1996 77.3 80.2 72.0 T6.0 100
1 1960-90 including West Germany; 1991-96 including Germany 
b Consumption is measured in terms of its own specific purchasing power parity 
Source: European Commission Statistical Annex (1996)____________________
’it should be noted, however, that given the massive restructuring that is taking place since the 
unification of Germany, any figure expressed as a percentage of the EU 15 average since 1991 





























































































The European Commission's (1990) One Market, One Money report points out 
that the EU periphery is characterised by higher unemployment than prevails in 
the EU core. This is a statistical artefact, however, since Spain, the country with 
the highest unemployment rate, is also by far the largest peripheral economy. 
However, all the peripheral countries can be seen to suffer from either 
unemployment or underemployment (which does not show up in the standard 
data). In what follows, we focus on a number of shared characteristics that are 
likely to increase the burdens of adjustment on peripheral labour markets, factors 
such as the relative importance of agriculture, the difficulties of adjusting to free 
trade, and the relative underdevelopment of financial markets and of physical 
infrastructure in the periphery. We then move on to analyse other structural 
similarities between peripheral countries: relative proportions of producer and 
consumer services, and the share of increasing returns sectors within 
manufacturing.
Unemployment and underemployment
Table 2.2 above illustrates that two of the peripheral countries, Ireland and Spain, 
have very high unemployment rates, while Greece and Portugal have rates below 
the EU average. The less well developed nature of the social welfare systems in 
Greece and Portugal, however, and the large proportion of the labour force 
engaged in agriculture in these countries suggest a substantial degree of 
underemployment. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.
Agricultural orientation
As the One Market, One Money report (C.E.C. (1990)) notes, Objective 1 
regions have a relatively high share of employment in the declining agricultural 
sector. Of the four countries, Greece has the largest proportion of employees in 
agriculture (20.8% of total employment in 1994). This compares with 18.3% in 
Portugal10, 13.2% in Ireland and 9.9% in Spain. This factor adds to the number of 
workers who must be absorbed into the urban labour force, or else, as in Portugal 
and Greece, provides a refuge in the form of underemployment for those who, in 
a more developed welfare system, would add to the unemployment rolls.
Underdevelopment o f infrastructure and capital markets
Two further characteristics of peripheral regions appear likely to hinder the 
development of employment opportunities. One is the underdeveloped state of
2.2 Structural similarities between peripheral regions





























































































financial markets. Larre and Torres (1991), in a study of Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, make the following points, many of which apply to Ireland as well:
‘In the mid-1980s financial markets were still in their infancy, with ... little or no 
competition between banks and financial institutions; narrow capital markets; a limited 
range of savings instruments and a preponderance of public debt securities; credit 
controls (Greece and Portugal) and administratively fixed interest rates; compulsory 
portfolio requirements for banks, and a high proportion of subsidised credit’.
This theme is echoed in One Market, One Money, which reports that the high 
cost of credit and poor availability of risk capital are among the major factors that 
firms in peripheral regions identify as growth inhibiting.
The same report also notes that firms identify infrastructural deficiencies in the 
areas of education and training, transport and communications, and the supply 
and cost of energy, as more important impediments than geographical factors 
such as the proximity of suppliers and of customers. The available data on the 
stock of infrastructure in peripheral regions provide supporting evidence. Table 
2.3 below, adapted from Martin and Rogers (1994), reports relative 
infrastructural levels for an aggregate of transportation, telecommunications, 
energy and education. It reveals that Ireland, Spain and Portugal fell further 
behind the EU average between 1979 and 1985, while Italy and Greece 
converged slightly.









Difficulties o f adjustment to free trade
Progressive trade liberalisation within Europe is likely to entail substantial 
industrial disruption in the periphery, while sectoral restructuring within core EU 
countries, which have fairly similar factor endowments, is more likely to take 
place through the development of market niches rather than through the wholesale 




























































































(1990), who shows that Greece and Portugal have less intra-industry trade than 
the other EU countries; Ireland, Spain and Italy have intermediate levels, while 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium are characterised by 
intense intra-industry trade. Adjustment problems are therefore likely to be 
greater in the periphery.
As Krugman (1987) notes with respect to the Southern periphery's accession to 
the EU:
‘The trade expansion produced by EC enlargement is simply not likely to be as painless 
as the trade expansion produced by the formation of the Community and earlier 
enlargement. There will certainly be income distribution problems created by the 
changes, and also quite possibly some real costs in terms of unemployment’.
A massive shake out of jobs in Irish and Spanish ‘traditional’ industry occurred 
as trade liberalisation progressed. The low productivity sectors in Greece and 
Portugal are also likely to face intense pressures in the next decade.
Further confirmation of the structural changes likely to be in store for Greece and 
Portugal is provided by the size structure of enterprises in peripheral regions, 
shown in Table 2.4. The National Economic and Social Council (1989) 
documents how the average size of establishments in Ireland declined in the wake 
of free trade as indigenous firms in increasing-returns sectors were wiped out. 
Something similar may have happened in Spain." Portugal may therefore be 
thought to resemble the pre-free-trade Irish position, while the fact that nearly 
three fifths of Greek non-agricultural employment is concentrated in micro 
enterprises with less than ten employees probably does not augur well for their 
ability to compete internationally.
Table 2.4: Non-agriculture employment shares by enterprise size, 1988
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU
Micro (0-9) 59 34 36 36 30
Small (10-99) 21 30 27 30 25
Medium (100-499) 11 18 17 17 16
Large (500+) 9 17 20 17 30
Source: First Annual Report of the European Observatory for SMEs (1993).
"On the basis of Ireland's adjustment, we would regard small initial firm size in increasing- 
returns sectors as a competitive disadvantage, rather than as representing an opportunity for 




























































































The structure o f the services sector
The economic geographers Keeble, Offord and Walker (1988) noted that the 
structure of the services sector differed significantly between core and periphery, 
with the core being relatively more specialised in producer services.1'
Table 2.5 below shows the ratio of employment in producer relative to consumer 
services. It shows, as Keeble et al. suggested, that there is a substantial difference 
between the relative proportions accounted for by producer and consumer 
services in the core vis-à-vis the periphery.
Table 2.5: Ratio of employment in producer versus consumer services
1968 1978 1983 1987
Belgium .299 .33 .327 .332
Germany .342 .316 .318 .314
France .343 .351 .344 .343
Netherlands .522 .308 .359 .362
Ireland .241 .251 .354 .332
Italy .40 .267 .262 .267
Portugal n.a. .259 .24 .225
Spain n.a. .294 .289 .269
Greece n.a. .457 .378 .345
Source: Duggan (1995)
It is clear that the core-periphery distinction is significant and long-lasting. 
Ireland, however, seems to have extricated itself from its peripheral position, 
particularly between 1978 and 1983, while Greece appears as the periphery 
outlier, with a ratio of producer to consumer services more like that of the core. 
The latter is easily explained however by the fact that Greece, containing as it 
does a large number of islands, possesses an unusually large transport, 
communications and storage sector which is part of producer services. Keeble et 
al. (1988) suggest that Ireland's core-like characteristics appear to be evidence of 
successful industrial policies.
Why does the core appear to be relatively specialised in producer services? 
Hansen (1990) argues that: 2
l2Producer services are defined in the NACE and ISIC classifications as categories 7 
(Transport and Communications) and 8 (Banking and Financial Services), while consumer 





























































































‘in an increasingly information-oriented economy, producer services play a pivotal role 
in the ... expanding division of labour, which in turn creates productivity increases 
throughout the economy. Regions that have a high density of producer services are 
thus likely to have higher per capita incomes than other regions’
Causation can equally plausibly run in the opposite direction. The fact that ‘core 
regions almost always contain above-average concentrations of highly qualified 
workers’ can be related to studies by Beyers et al. (1986) and Wier (1992) which 
showed that the producer services sector is dominated by professional and 
technical employees, while consumer services are typically labour-intensive low- 
productivity low-wage jobs. Whichever direction of causation is more important, 
it is clear that a high ratio of producer to consumer services jobs is beneficial.
Increasing retums-to-scale manufacturing sectors
Equivalently, it is beneficial for a region to have a high share of the manufacturing 
sectors that exhibit increasing returns to scale (IRS). As Heffeman and Sinclair 
(1990) note, average productivity in the regions that capture these sectors rises 
relative to that prevailing elsewhere.
One of the potential difficulties that the periphery faced in adjusting to EU 
membership was the possibility that as trade barriers fell these industries would 
be attracted more to the core because of economies of agglomeration. Indeed, as 
Barry (1994) showed, this process did result in the decline of Irish indigenous 
industry in IRS sectors.13 However the influx of multinational companies in 
precisely these sectors more than dominated this decline, so the share of Irish 
employment in IRS sectors has increased substantially (Table 2.6). 1*
Table 2.6: Developments in IRS industries in Ireland
1973 1980 1993
Indigenous employment 25,209 27,440 22,565
Share of total manufacturing 12.46% 11.86% 11.64%
Multinational employment 32,735 50,114 59,055
Share of total manufacturing 16.18% 21.67% 30.46%
Source: IDA Employment Survey
11 The IRS sectors are identified by O'Malley (1992) on the basis of Pratten's (1988) study of




























































































Summing multinational and indigenous employment, we find the share of IRS 
sectors in total manufacturing employment has risen from 29% in 1973 to 42% by 
1993. While this is still small relative to the equivalent share in the core EU 
countries (Table 2.7 below), it has been increasing over time rather than 
decreasing.
Once again, we see a very clear core-periphery pattern emerging, with the 
periphery less specialised in IRS sectors. Unfortunately the paucity of data 
precludes an analysis of how this situation has changed over the course of the 
1980s.
Table 2.7: Employment in IRS sectors as a % of total manufacturing 
employment
1968 1979 1983 1989
Germany 55 60 65 63
France 42 55 55 51
Netherlands 50 62 54 54
Belgium 42 57 55 53
Italy 49 54 56 55
Ireland 21 35 40 45
Spain n.a. 38 39 37
Portugal n.a. n.a. 28 25
Greece n.a. n.a. 36 35
Source: Eurostat: Structure and Activity of Industry, various years.
If the Irish experience is anything to go by, however, we can say that the 
periphery is likely to capture an increasing share of IRS industries. The data on 
foreign direct investment in manufacturing14 reveal that while the Irish share of 
foreign direct investment (as a proportion of GNP) was twice as large as Spain's 
and three times as large as Portugal's in the early 1980s, the Portuguese and Irish 
shares had been equalised by the early 1990s, and the Spanish share was now 
twice as large as these. Only the Greek share remained low, and stagnant.




























































































3. Peripheral Labour Markets: Stylised Facts
In the previous section we discussed general aspects of the economics of 
peripherality. We now narrow our focus to the labour markets in the main EU 
peripheral areas: Greece, Ireland and Portugal and Spain'5. We start with a 
review of labour market facts and then go on to examine the institutional 
arrangements in the periphery, such as the social welfare systems and wage 
bargaining systems in each of the countries under consideration.
3.1 Aspects of unemployment
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of unemployment in each of these countries over 
the last three decades, all drawn to a common scale. It is clear that unemployment 
has been rising over time throughout the EU periphery, with some countries 
experiencing more unemployment than others. In Ireland and Spain, with current 
rates of 13.5% and 22.5% respectively, unemployment has not been below 10% 
since the end of the 1970s, while in Greece and Portugal the unemployment rate 
has yet to exceed 10% at any time over the last three decades and this still holds 
true with current rates of 9.1% and 7.4% respectively.
What this aggregated figure for unemployment cannot reveal are the important 
characteristics of those comprising the unemployed and also those within 
employment itself which would give a more accurate picture of the peripheral 
labour markets than an aggregate indicator could possibly provide. In this section, 
we examine specific forms of unemployment such as defined by age and duration 
and gender. We shall first consider the possibility of underemployment.
Underemployment
In any analysis of unemployment in the periphery, consideration must be given to 
the probability that there is significant underemployment. Underemployment is 
not a phenomenon that is recorded in any official statistics as is unemployment. 
As a result, we must use a proxy to capture it.
(a) Percentage employed in agriculture as a proxy for underemployment 
Employment in the agriculture sector could be one such proxy, due to the family 
run nature of this sector. The above average importance of this sector in the 
periphery compared to the EU average has been briefly mentioned earlier. Figure
3.2 shows that in Greece the percentage of employed persons engaged in this
Our analysis is also of some relevance to the Italian Mezzogiomo region and to Northern 



























































































sector remains very high compared with the rest of the EU, which may indicate 
that underemployment is prevalent and is disguised in a relatively large 
agriculture sector.
fb) Percentage self-emploved as a proxy for underemployment 
Due to the family run nature of agriculture in these countries, unpaid family 
labour is likely to be an important feature of the labour force in agriculture (Table 
3.1). The total number of family workers in agriculture and non-agriculture in 
total civilian employment could be considered as a second proxy for 
underemployment It can be seen that unpaid family workers in Greece in 1991 
constituted 36% of total employment (as it also did in 1981). On the other hand, 
unpaid family labour is very small (5%) in non agricultural activities, suggesting 





























































































Figure 3.1: Unemployment rates in the four cohesion countries
Unemployment rate: Greece Unemployment rate: Ireland
Unemployment rate: Portugal Unemployment rate: Spain




























































































Ireland does not have as much unpaid family labour in either year as in the case 
of Greece. About 9% of employment in agriculture in 1991 was classified as 
unpaid family labour and this had fallen from 16% ten years previously. The level 
of unpaid family labour in non agricultural activities is negligible in Ireland, so it 
would appear that underemployment it is not an Irish problem.
The data for Portugal would suggest that between 1979 and 1991 unpaid family 
labour has either drifted into or been reclassified as the second category of 
employers and persons working on own account. But self employment in a 
declining sector such as agriculture may effectively be a form of 
underemployment. Recalling the unemployment rates in Table 2.2, Portugal had a 
below average unemployment rate compared to the EU average but it is likely 
that self employment in agriculture is where some underemployment is present.
In 1991 Spain had almost 20% of those employed in agriculture classified as 
unpaid family labour, a matter of concern when considered alongside the already 
high recorded unemployment rate. Again, a pattern emerges for Spain that there is 
a higher incidence of unpaid family labour in agricultural related employment 




























































































Table 3.1: Professional status of civilian employment: Cohesion countries
(a) Greece
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1981 1991
thousands ( % ) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 35 (3) 30 (4)
Employers and persons working on own account 657 (61) 487 (60)
Unpaid family workers 391 (36) 290 (36)
Total 1083 (100) 807 (100)
Non agricultural activities 1981 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 1664 (68) 1900(67)
Employers and persons working on own account 680 (28) 792 (28)
Unpaid family workers 104 (4) 134 (5)
Total 2446(100) 2826(100)
(b) Ireland
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1981 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 23 (12) 23 (15)
Employers and persons working on own account 142 (72) 117 (76)
Unpaid family workers 32 (16) 14 (9)
Total 196 (100) 154(100)
Non agricultural activities 1981 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 839 (89.5) 830 (86.5)
Employers and persons working on own account 97 (10) 125(13)
Unpaid family workers 5 (0.5) 4 (0.4)





























































































Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1979* 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 239 (20) 140(17)
Employers and persons working on own account 391 (33) 589 (70)
Unpaid family workers 547 (47) 106(13)
Total 1177 (100) 836(100)
Non agricultural activities 1979* 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 2257 (84) 3195 (80.4)
Employers and persons working on own account 323 (12) 705 (18)
Unpaid family workers 97 (4) 63 (1.6)
Total 2677 (100) 3964(100)
(d) Spain
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1981 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 
Employers and persons working on own account 










Non agricultural activities 1981 1991
thousands (%) thousands (%)
Wage earners and salaried employees 
Employers and persons working on own account 







































































































Figure 3.2: Percentage of total employment in agriculture
Agricultural Labour Force
Percentage of total employment
High dependency rates
The dependency rate shown in Table 3.2 is defined as the ratio between the 
inactive and active population. If the welfare of all the population not in 
employment is considered to be dependent on those in employment, then Ireland, 
Spain and Greece have exceptionally high dependency rates. The seriousness of 
unemployment in the periphery has already been highlighted above but the extent 




























































































Table 3.2: Percentage inactive relative to active population
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU 1516
1980 165.2 172.7 116.6 177.0 133.7
1982 150.8 169.1 119.0 177.4 131.5
1984 144.2 170.0 113.5 175.7 218.8
1986 144.6 170.7 116.2 172.2 126.4
1988 141.3 169.9 112.9 159.2 121.9
1990 141.9 167.7 107.3 154.1 120.8
1992 144.4 160.9 105.7 153.3 117.6
1994 140.9a 155.2 104.8 149.3 120.5
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey 1980 1994 
a 1993 Figure
In Ireland in 1994 this ratio was 155.2%, in Spain 149.3% and in Greece 140.9%, 
compared to an EU average of 120.5%. Portugal is the exception, with a low rate 
of 104.8%. This places a greater burden on the social welfare system or, in the 
absence of a developed social welfare system, the burden lies with other family 
members as in the case of Greece, which has considerable unpaid family labour in 
agriculture. As mentioned, the magnitude of unemployment is a major component 
of this problem, as well as the demographics of each of these countries which 
result in very young and very old populations.
Youth Unemployment
We show two measures of youth unemployment. The first measure recorded in 
Table 3.3(a) is as a percentage of total unemployment, indicating the component 
within unemployment that comprises those under 25 years of age. Unfortunately 
data are only available from 1983 onwards. From this table, it can be seen that in 
1994 at least 25% of total unemployment was in the 20 to 24 age group for all the 
countries under study. A large figure may be indicative of a failure of the 
educational system to match the labour requirements of industry. It may also 
suggest a youthful population.
The second definition of youth unemployment used in Table 3.3(b) is the 
proportion of total population aged 15 to 24 which is in the labour force and not 
currently working for pay or self employed. This is interesting in that a large 
figure compared to the rate for all age groups would again suggest that the young
l6Figures for EU 15 include the new German Lander from 1991 onwards. Prior to 1991 this 




























































































labour force were receiving inadequate training and were not able to compete 
with the older labour force due to lack of skills or experience.
Table 3.3(a): Youth unemployment (under 25 years of age) as a per cent of 
total unemployment (Definition 1)
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU 1517
1983 40.7 40.3 54.3 52.9 45.3$
1987 43.8 36.1 48.1 47.4 39.1s
1990 45.4 32.4 42.7 40.1 34.4$
1994 39.2 31.4 33.9 33.5 28.2
Source: Eurostat (1996) Employment and Unemployment: Aggregates 1980-1994 
SEU 12 is the EU 15 excluding Sweden, Finland and Austria.
In the case of Greece, youth unemployment (definition 1) has remained fairly 
stable at around 40 to 45% throughout the period 1983 to 1994. In the case of 
Ireland, this figure has been gradually falling from a peak of 40% in 1983 to 
31.4% in 1994. One explanation for this could be the increasing trend for young 
people to stay on longer in the educational system. Portugal appeared to have the 
greatest level of youth unemployment in the early 1980s compared to the other 
countries, with rates of over 50%. This has since fallen to about 34% in 1994 for 
reasons similar to those for Ireland. In the case of Spain, this figure was 33.5% in 
1994 but it had fallen from almost 46% in 1991.
Youth unemployment in Greece is quite a severe problem by either definition. In 
1994, the youth unemployment rate (14-24 years) when calculated as a 
percentage of total labour force in this age group (definition 2) stood at 27.7% 
compared with a total unemployment rate of 9.6%. Spain has a very large youth 
unemployment rate also with the rate in 1994 standing 45.3%. Portugal appears to 
have the lowest incidence of youth unemployment of 15.1% according to 
definition 2 in 1994. One possible reason for this could be that the younger 
population were benefiting from the strong employment growth experienced in 
Portugal in the late 1980s. This would appear to be the case when one considers 
that youth unemployment fell from 15.3% in 1987 to 8.8% in 1991 (a fall of 6.5 
percentage points) while the unemployment rate for all ages fell by only 2.7 
percentage points over the same period from 7.0% in 1987 to 4.3% in 1991. This




























































































would indicate that the younger population was more likely to have the required 
skills for the new public sector jobs that were being created.
Table 3.3(b): Youth unemployment rates (under 25 years of age) as a per 
cent of total labour force in this age group (Definition 2)
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU 1518
1975 14.2 9.8 9.0
1980 16.5 25.4
1983 21.1 20.5 18.2 41.9 21.8s
1987 22.9 24.3 15.3 43.2 20.6s
1990 21.5 19.4 10.0 32.3 16.1s
1994 27.7 23.3 15.1 45.3 21.8
Source: Eurostat (1996) Employment and Unemployment 1980 1994 
Figures prior to 1983 from OECD Labour Force Statistics 1972-1992 
lEU 12 only i.e. excludes Sweden, Finland and Austria.
Unemployment rates by degree o f urbanisation
The data in Table 3.4 suggest that in the case of Greece, measured unemployment 
is heavily concentrated in the urban areas but is much lower and apparently stable 
in the rural areas. However, results from surveys suggest that rural areas are 
subject to much higher levels of underemployment19. This trend of high urban 
unemployment and low rural unemployment, does not appear to follow for the 
other countries under study for the year 1994 as the rates do not appear to be 
significantly different from each other.
l8See previous footnote.
'’Commission for the European Communties, Country Studies (1992): Greece, No.9, July, 




























































































Table 3.4: Unemployment rates by degree of urbanisation in 1994
Greece* Ireland Portugal Spain EU 1520
Unemployment rate 8.9 14.6 6.7 24.3 11.4
Densely populated 
area
11.2 16.1 7.7 24.3 12.2
Intermediate 6.8 n/a 4.3 26.5 9.6
Thinly populated 
area
3.8) 13.6 7.3 22.8 11.8
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey 1994
Long-term unemployment
Long term unemployment (LTU) is defined as those out of work for more than 12 
months. Table 3.5 shows this component as a percentage of total unemployment. 
Comparable data were not available for these countries prior to 1983. It can be 
clearly seen that the incidence of LTU in all of the countries under study is very 
high and has been an important feature since the from when the data were 
available.
Table 3.5: Long term unemployment as a per cent of total unemployment
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU 1521
1983 32.3 35.2
1987 43.9 63.8 53.4 60.6 52.8
1990 49.5 64.7 44.1 51.1 48.6
1994 50.5 64.3 43.4 52.7 48.0
Source: Eurostat (1996) Employment and Unemployment: Aggregates 1980-1994. 
'EU 12 is the EU 15 excluding Sweden, Finland and Austria.
In the cases of Greece and Ireland, this rate has been rising over time although by 
different amounts. In the case of Greece, LTU has risen from 32.3% in 1983 to 
50.5% in 1994. In Ireland, the situation is more disturbing as the rate has risen 
from 35.2% in 1983 to 64.3% in 1994. In the cases of Portugal and Spain, LTU 
appears to have fallen during the period 1986 to 1994 for which data were 
available, although only by 10 and 6 percentage points respectively. In the cases





























































































of Ireland and Spain, which had the highest rate of LTU in 1994, the social 
welfare entitlement system is more developed, a factor that also serves to 
encourage registration as being unemployed rather than departure from the labour 
force.
Unemployment broken down by gender
Unemployment rates for each of the four cohesion countries has been broken 
down by gender in Table 3.6. In Greece, unemployment among females in 1994 
(13.7%) is considerably higher compared to their male counterparts (6.0%). 
Similar marginalisation of women prevails in the Spanish labour market where, in 
1994, the female unemployment rate 31.5% greatly exceeded the male rate of 
19.9%. The female youth unemployment rate in Spain, not shown below, was 
again 12 percentage points higher than the male youth rate. In Ireland and 
Portugal, unemployment has been higher among females than males but to a small 
extent.
Table 3.6: Male and female unemployment rates
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain EU 15**
M F M F M F M F M F
1974 n/a n/a 6.6 3.7 1.2 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9
1977 n/a n/a 10.1 6.9 5.2 10.3 4.9 5.5 5.0 6.0
1980 n/a n/a 8.8 7.1 3.5 13.0 10.4 12.8 5.3 7.2
1983 5.3 10.6 13.3 15.4 4.9 11.8 16.2 20.5 8.4 11.3
1987 4.6 10.4 15.9 18.0 5.3 9.0 17.0 27.7 8.6 12.6
1990 3.9 10.8 12.8 14.6 3.2 6.2 11.9 24.1 6.5 10.4
1994 6.0 13.7 14.4 15.0 6.1 8.0 19.9 31.5 10.0 12.8
Source: Eurostat employment and unemployment (various editions)
“ Prior to and including 1990 these figures refer to the EU 12.
* * 1980 - 1982 refer to EU 10; Prior to and including 1979 refer to EU 9
3.2 Social Welfare Systems in the Periphery
The contrasting unemployment outcomes in the periphery broadly mirrors 
differences in social welfare systems. In the OECD, increases in the generosity if 
unemployment insurance, both in terms of replacement rates and duration of 
benefits, have been associated with rising unemployment and a high incidence of 
long-term unemployment, particularly in Spain and Ireland. Equally, the limited 
social welfare systems in Greece and Portugal cast doubt on the extent to which 
the recorded unemployment figures are an accurate representation of the true 




























































































The institutional setting in the Greek labour market reflects several distinguishing 
characteristics of the economy. Specifically, about half the economy is made up 
of the self employed - split roughly between agriculture and other sectors - and 
the vast majority of firms are very small economic units with few employees, who 
are often of the same family. Partly as a result, but also arising from cultural 
factors, there exists a strong family support system in place, which serves as a 
social safety net rather than a well developed publicly provided system of social 
security. The institutional framework has accommodated these factors, and may 
assist in perpetuating them. For example, the unemployment benefit system is 
ungenerous by international standards, as unemployment has only been recently 
recognised as a serious problem. Thus benefits do not provide the disincentive to 
work embodied in the official support systems of other countries such as Ireland 
[OECD (1996a)].
The Portuguese social security system, is a relatively new system compared to 
those of other European countries. The system was fundamentally changed in 
1974, becoming universal with the creation of the non-contributory scheme. 
Protection continues to differ for some categories of workers (e.g. banking and 
public sector) who remain covered by special regimes outside the general system. 
Plans to incorporate these special regimes have not been fully put into effect.
Since 1985 social security expenditure has increased more rapidly , in Portugal 
than in the rest of the OECD, although at an estimated 11.8% of GDP in 1995, 
spending was still well below the EU average of around 18%. In particular, such 
expenditure was low in each of the major categories including unemployment 
benefits. The current unemployment insurance scheme requires that claimants 
should have held a job for at least 540 days in the preceding 24 months, while the 
maximum duration of the benefit is related to the worker’s age. In 1995, the 
average benefit period was 17 months. Portugal’s social security system imposes 
a high tax on labour directly, as unlike other European countries, general tax 
revenues are not used to finance welfare programmes [OECD (1996b)].
Between 1970 and 1992. the Spanish Government significantly expanded the 
coverage and generosity of the unemployment insurance system. Since then, 
reforms aimed at reducing the budgetary cost of this component of public 
expenditure were introduced which included tighter controls against fraud, stricter 
eligibility conditions and reductions in the duration of benefits. Benefit fraud is 
considered to be a serious problem in Spain, which is believed to have a thriving 
underground economy. At present, the Spanish unemployment system remains 
generous by the standards of other OECD countries. Earnings related benefits 
have typical replacement rates of around 70% falling to 60% after a period of six 
months for a maximum duration of 24 months (for those having contributed for at 




























































































responsibilities unemployment assistance benefits are also available for up to an 
additional 18 months [OECD (1996c)].
While the Spanish social welfare system is an intermediate case, the Irish system 
in effect offers permanent support to the unemployed. Benefits paid are 
predominantly flat rate with increases for adult and child dependants, unrelated to 
income when in work. Unemployment benefit includes a limited earnings related 
element but mainly depends on the contribution record of the person concerned 
and is payable for up to 15 months. At the end of this period and where there is 
no entitlement to benefit, means tested social assistance is paid indefinitely to 
these without income for a legitimate reason and where income and savings are 
below a specified level. The rates at which assistance is paid tends to be lower 
than benefit rates but in contrast to the Southern periphery, the scheme is 
designed to bring income up to a subsistence level [C.E.C. (1993c)].
3.3 Wage Determination Systems in the EU Periphery
Because of the centrality of wage determination in closing models of the labour 
market, it is worth looking at the institutional wage setting framework in the 
periphery prior to our examination of econometric work in Sections 4 and 5 
below. Broadly speaking, wage setting ranges from a fairly centralised system in 
Greece, through to more flexible approaches in Portugal. Each country shall be 
described briefly below.
During the 1980s, the wage bargaining system in Greece followed an automatic 
indexation system (ATA). The government set non-binding wage increases and 
these, combined with indexation to inflation, produced large wage increases and a 
reduction in inter-sectoral wage differentials. Since 1990, however, radical 
improvements have been made to the wage formation system. The most important 
contributions of the 1990 reforms were the abolition of an automatic indexation 
mechanism and the decentralisation and broadening of the collective bargaining 
process to provide for settlements at the sectoral and firm level. Other attempts at 
improving labour market flexibility include the removal of restrictions on part 
time work since 1991 and limits have been imposed on sudden strikes, 
particularly in public utilities. Although improvements have been made, the strike 
record in public utilities remains poor. The decline in union density since 1985 
may be signalling a less militant, less politicised labour market environment. 
Nevertheless, trade unions remain powerful and are sustained by political 
affiliations, as well as favourable strike and lock out legislation [OECD (1996a)]. 
Since Spain’s entry in 1986 to the EU, a range of structural factors still restrict 
flexibility in the labour market. For example, a strict system of employment 




























































































severance payments and low rates of hiring; the wage bargaining system is 
inflexible; and since the 1980s there has been a relatively generous benefit 
system. Together, all these factors have acted as disincentives to the take-up of 
jobs.
Focusing on the wage bargaining system, collective bargaining at the regional and 
sectoral level determines the bulk of wage increases, leaving little room for firm- 
level wage flexibility. Pay norms established during collective negotiations apply 
more or less uniformly across all regions and sectors concerned and there is 
widespread use of indexation clauses. Nearly all firms and 75% of workers’ 
wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements, despite union 
membership being low at around 16% of all workers22. Most often, the companies 
involved in negotiations are those which can afford to pay the highest wages. 
Despite reforms in 1994 to make wages more responsive to local conditions 
instead of simply adjusting according to collective agreements, firms experiencing 
financial difficulty have not been very successful in getting workers to agree to 
deviations from regional and sectoral agreements [OECD( 1996c)].
Portugal and Spain are polar opposites in terms wage rate behaviour. The 
Portuguese labour market showed considerable resilience in absorbing the oil 
price and labour supply shocks of the 1970s. In fact, empirical research suggests 
that nominal wage growth responds rather strongly to the rate of unemployment 
compared with most other OECD countries. In the second half of the 1980s, the 
new growth opportunities provided by EU membership led to a parallel reduction 
in unemployment and wage inflation. In contrast, the disinflation of the 1990s has 
been associated with rising unemployment as might be expected but the small 
magnitude of this increase signifies a substantial short term trade off [OECD 
(1996b)]. Larger earnings differentials at all levels is also supportive of the case 
that substantial wage flexibility still remains in Portugal, even if it is more likely 
to be a consequence of an underdeveloped social welfare system rather than 
deliberate wage restraint on the part of well organised powerful trade unions. 
Minimum wages were instituted in 1974 but have had little effect on the wage 
negotiation process in recent years, with only 6.5% of employees being paid at 
the minimum wage level in 1993 [OECD (1993c)].
The Irish experience since 1987 has also been one of tripartite centralised 
bargaining with agreements of three years duration concluded in 1987, 1991 and 
1994 [OECD (1993b)]. The first two programmes set basic pay increases and
22The apparent paradox between rigid wage setting agreements and low trade union 
membership in Spain, can be explained by government legislation in this area that is likely to 




























































































allowed for limited additional localised bargaining in the private sector to reflect 
the economic circumstances of firms. This clause generally resulted in wage 
increases above the target set. Real wages grew more slowly than productivity in 
the period 1987-90. However, there is no research evidence to suggest that the 
resulting wage increases were lower than they would have been in the absence of 
a centralised agreement. The complex negotiating procedures involved provided 
little scope for flexibility. The low target set in the first agreement meant that 
localised bargaining began with reduced expectations of wage increases. Special 
awards made to the public sector with the objective of restoring comparability 
with the private sector resulted in large public sector pay bills in the early 1990s. 
The recently negotiated Programme for Competitiveness and Work which will 
run from 1994-96 provides for pay increases at the expected rate of inflation, with 
freedom to undertake additional localised bargaining. A review of the agreement 
is provided for in the third year in the light of economic and social developments 
during the period.
4. The Periphery in Cross-Country Econometric Studies
We have described above some of the great diversity of labour market behaviour 
in the four main EU periphery countries and provided some heuristic explanations 
for how they deviate from the core and from each other. In attempting to explain 
this diversity, and the wider behaviour of unemployment in the EU during the 
1980s, there is a strong temptation to seek out encompassing models that 
differentiate between the different member states only on the basis of parameter 
values within a common encompassing analytic-theoretic framework. For all their 
flaws and limitations, any insights that can be offered by such models into the 
causes and cures of unemployment are triply powerful, having intellectual 
coherence, parsimony and near universal applicability.
At the one extreme, such encompassing models can consist of a single 
reduced-form equation explaining unemployment, as in the seminal work of 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (LNJ) (1991). At the other extreme, the 
encompassing framework can be a complex medium or large-scale structural 
macroeconometric model such as the European Commission's QUEST [Brandsma 
et al. (1991)] or the more recently developed HERMIN models of the periphery 
[Bradley, Herce and Modesto 1995]. However, in using such formalised 
model-based approaches, one must be satisfied that the models being used have 




























































































With a focus on a EU periphery consisting of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain, we examine the insights yielded by existing econometric work.23 In this 
section, we start with the LNJ (1991) approach, and examine the conclusions of 
this work in so far as they apply to the peripheral economies. We then look at the 
EU Commission's QUEST macroeconometric model and its labour market 
implications, once again from the point of view of the periphery. Finally, in the 
next section we describe some more recent work carried out by teams in the four 
periphery countries, involving HERMIN, a modelling approach that attempts to 
take into account some of the specific features of the economies involved to a 
greater extent than was possible within either the LNJ or QUEST exercises.
4.1 Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) on the periphery:
The most authoritative example of empirical work based on a one or two equation 
reduced-form approach is LNJ (1991). In chapter 11 of their book they address 
the question: "Why has unemployment differed between countries?", using a 
reduced form equation explaining movements in unemployment that includes both 
demand and supply side elements. Two of the EU periphery members are 
included in the international cross-section: Ireland and Spain. Unfortunately, 
Greece and Portugal are excluded, but we have seen above that the large 
agricultural labour forces and the basic nature of the social welfare system make 
the data on unemployment unreliable in these latter two countries.
The LNJ study aims at explaining two key stylised facts: the higher 
unemployment in every country in the 1980s compared to the 1960s; and the 
vastly higher EU unemployment compared with the better performance of the 
EFTA members, Japan, Oceania and North America. The model consists of two 
equations: a price equation (or, equivalently, a marginal revenue product 
condition, written as a dynamic employment equation) and a wage equation (or 
Phillips curve). Total employment is used (i.e., agriculture is included with 
non-agriculture; public with private), the price used is the aggregate deflator of 
GDP, but the wage is taken as the narrower measure of hourly earnings in 
manufacturing.
Solving their price and wage equations for the unemployment rate gives an 
explanation in terms of the following factors:
:3Our comments have relevance for the labour market problems of Northern Ireland, which is 
part of the United Kingdom, but shares some of the characteristics of its Southern neighbour, 




























































































i. real wage rigidity1 - RWR (i.e., the extent to which wage pressure is converted 
into unemployment at constant inflation);
ii. nominal wage rigidity -NWR (i.e., the long-run inflation-unemployment 
trade-off, measured as the long-run cumulative unemployment cost of reducing 
inflation by one point);
'ni.hysteresis - H (measured as the coefficient on lagged unemployment or as the 
mean lag on unemployment taking into account all dynamics).
Given that Ireland and Spain had the highest rise in unemployment during the 
1980s, it is interesting to see how the LNJ approach accounts for this behaviour 
(LNJ, pp. 405-430). First, RWR is low in Ireland (0.27, similar to Belgium and 
France), but high in Spain (0.52, similar to Denmark, Germany and the UK). No 
clear pattern emerges for NWR. Hysteresis is all pervasive, in the EU and 
elsewhere, with Ireland's mean lag the highest within the EU. Finally, the effect of 
unemployment on wage and price setting in the underlying structural equations is 
atypical for Ireland, where the influence on price setting is bigger than for wage 
setting.24
The LNJ reduced form unemployment equation can be used to explain the 
changes in unemployment from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s in terms of:
i. The change in annual increase in inflation, and
ii. The size of the two oil shocks on each country (measured as the percentage 
rise in real import prices weighted by the share of imports)
The estimated reduced form equation is as follows:
Am = 1.93 - 0.35(NWR) A(A2 p) + 1.90 (RWR) Shock + 11.59 SP
For Ireland, Spain and Germany (for comparison), Table 4.1 below shows the 
decomposition of the rise in unemployment:
24The implied strong demand effects in Irish pricing behaviour are simply not credible and must 




























































































Table 4.1: Layard, Nickel] and Jackman (1991), pp. 409: 




World shock Dummy Constant
Ireland (6.9) 0.37 4.51 0.0 1.93
Spain (13.8) 0.49 0.69 11.6 1.93
Germany (5.1) 0.22 4.07 0.0 1.93
Hence this decomposition tells us nothing about the rise in Spanish 
unemployment (other than that it was associated with "the wage explosion that 
accompanied the end of the Franco era"), and attributes most of the Irish (and 
German) rise to the world "shock" variable. As a detailed taxonomy of the likely 
influences on unemployment, the LNJ study offers useful insights, but one is left 
with the impression, at least in the case of Ireland and Spain, that the level of 
aggregation is too great to get to the bottom of the complex processes of domestic 
institutional and structural change that these countries, together with the missing 
Greece and Portugal, were undergoing.
4.2 The European Commission's QUEST model on the periphery
The EU Commission's QUEST quarterly macroeconometric model is a unique 
source of econometric research findings that embraces all four of the peripheral 
countries within a common modelling framework, albeit one with a restriction to 
a two production sector model (public and private). An examination of its 
structure can give valuable insights into the likely behaviour of the individual 
periphery members, and a comparison with the core countries. In addition, the 
QUEST model was used in the Commission’s White Paper to justify a reduction 
of employer's social security contributions as a desirable way of reducing 
unemployment [C.E.C. (1993a), pp. 140-142], making it necessary to evaluate 
the usefulness of the conclusions for the periphery.25 In what follows we briefly 
review the key characteristics of the periphery as portrayed in QUEST, focusing 
on the labour and capital demand schedules, the price equation and the wage 
equation, and comment on some shocks evaluated with the model.
Although the long-run elasticities with respect to real GDP are constrained to 
unity in the QUEST labour demand schedules, the short-term elasticities can vary
^'Neither of the two other models used in the White Paper, MIMIC (for the Netherlands) and 




























































































and the four periphery elasticities are very large (highest for Portugal (0.72), 
lowest for Ireland (0.40), but only 0.08 for Belgium). This finding is consistent 
with the stylised facts concerning core-periphery differences in production 
relationships examined in Section 2 above. The peripheral real wage cost 
elasticities are also much higher, both in the short and long run, with Ireland 
being the outlier on the low side.26 Finally, the annual rate of labour-embodied 
technical change is highest for the four periphery countries, consistent with their 
rapid development and restructuring.27
With the exception of Ireland, the periphery does not stand out quite so 
dramatically in terms of demand for capital equipment. Ireland shows a very large 
sensitivity to changes in final demand, and a high elasticity with respect to 
profitability (measured as the share of gross operating surplus in GDP). Portugal 
has the second highest elasticity, at 1.95, while Spain and Greece are fifth (at 
0.76) and seventh (0.61), respectively. A possible explanation of this diversity 
goes to the heart of how small, open, developing economies can have an 
important supply-side link to core developed economies through foreign direct 
investment by multinational companies [Bradley and Fitz Gerald (1988)].
The wage-price determination in QUEST has many similarities to the LNJ (1991) 
approach. The deflator of GDP is determined by wage costs, demand and 
competitive conditions, in an equation of the form:
p = aQ + a{ wc+ a2 upro+ a3 uc+ a^[p m - L(pm)] + ere
where
p = product price
wc = nominal wage
uc = capacity utilisation rate
upro = labour productivity
pm - import price
ere = error correction mechanism
2'The explanation for the low wage cost elasticity in the Irish case is probably associated with 
the high share of employment in multinational enterprises, for which factor proportions are 
largely determined in the country of origin [Bradley and Fitz Gerald (1988)].
27These high rates on technical change in the periphery imply high employment thresholds 
(using the White Paper terminology, pp. 43). This means that output must grow at above 3% 




























































































Although the long-run wage-cost elasticity is constrained to unity (other than for 
Ireland), the short-run elasticities for the periphery members are grouped close 
together at the high end of the scale. Prices are relatively insensitive to capacity 
utilisation (other than Greece), and the short run influence of labour productivity 
is quite large for the periphery as a group (and Belgium). Import prices (a proxy 
for competitive conditions) are constrained to have only a temporary influence on 
the mark-up producer price model, the permanent effect being assumed to pass 
through consumer prices.
Turning finally to the wage equation, the standard bargaining model (or 
augmented Phillips curve) approach is used:
wr =  aQ +  a pc+ a2 (p c -  p) + a3 upro+a lur+ a^blur
where
wr -  nominal wage 
pc = consumption price
p = value-added price (used to define the “terms-of-trade” effect pc = p 
upro= labour productivity 
lur = unemployment rate
The periphery members differ slightly with respect to the degree of short-run 
indexation to the consumption deflator (nearly full indexation for Spain and 
Portugal; about half that for Greece and Ireland), but are constrained to full (or 
almost full) indexation in the long run.28 In the Phillips curve (or unemployment 
effect), wage inflation in Portugal is by far the most sensitive to movements in 
unemployment (a=  -1.95, nearly twice as high as the next nearest (Japan, at 
-1.17), and nearly six times higher than the nearest periphery country (Ireland, at 
-0.35).
The terms-of-trade effect is almost unity for Greece, Portugal and Spain, but is 
very small (-0.14) for Ireland, a puzzling finding in light of the extreme openness 
of the Irish economy (Table 6.2 in Brandsma et al. (1991) shows Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands to be the most open EU economies). The positive 
productivity term in the wage equation is constrained to be equal to the size of the 
negative productivity term in the producer price equation, and hence is not a 
cause of inflation.
28The consumption deflator is determined as a weighted average of the producer price (p) and 




























































































The consequences of the above key equations in QUEST can be illustrated by 
subjecting the four periphery models to a public investment shock equal to 1% of 
baseline GDP. The results are shown in Figure 4.1 (a)-(c).
At one extreme, the Irish response is for a sustained rise in real GDP of 0.8%, a 
modest increase in wage inflation (rising to 0.7%) and a sustained reduction in the 
unemployment rate of 0.2 percentage points relative to the baseline. At the other 
extreme, the short term increase in Portuguese real GDP of 0.8 is quickly reduced 
to zero, there is a large rise in wage rates of nearly 3.5%, and unemployment rises 
by 0.2 percentage points relative to the baseline. Greece and Spain are 
intermediate cases.
If these results were to be taken literally, then CSF-type policies would be 
relatively ineffective in the Southern periphery in promoting sustained higher 
growth. In fact the QUEST simulations ignore key supply-side responses that 
would be associated with improvements in public infrastructure and human 
resources, and focus on the more Keynesian demand-side effects. A better 
treatment of these supply-side responses would seem to require a more 
disaggregated approach to modelling of the peripheral economies. The HERMIN 




























































































Unlinked QUEST Simulation: 1 % of GDP Public Investment: Effect on Real GDP
Figure 4.1(a):
Effects on Real GDP
Percentage difference from  baseline
Figure 4.1(b):
Unlinked QUEST Simulation: 1 %  of GDP Public Investment: Effect on Nominal Wage
Rate
Effects on Nominal W age Rale





























































































Unlinked QUEST Simulation: 1 %  of GDP Public Investment: Effect on Unemployment
Rate
Effects on Unemployment Rate




























































































5. Sectoral and Development Issues: The Hermin Model
The LNJ (1991) approach is essentially a single sector reduced form analysis of 
the labour market. The QUEST econometric model extends this to a structural 
model, and focuses on the private sector. A recent peripheral modelling project, 
the HERMIN model, extends the level of disaggregation to four sectors [Bradley, 
Herce and Modesto, 1995]:
i. A manufacturing (or largely traded goods) sector
ii. A services and utilities (or largely non-traded) sector
iii. Agriculture, forestry and fishing
iv. The non-market sector (public administration, health and education)
Complete HERMIN models exist for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
(Bradley, Herce and Modesto, 1995; Barry et al, 1996). Extensive use has been 
made of the Irish model to study the causes of the rapid rise in Irish 
unemployment between 1980 and 1986 [Barry and Bradley (1991)], with findings 
that contrast with those of LNJ (1991) and with Newell and Symons (1990), 
which was in the LNJ tradition. Basically, domestic policy mistakes are found to 
play a much more important role in accounting for the rise in Irish unemployment 
during the 1980s than that assigned to them by the LNJ approach. In addition, the 
HERMIN models have recently been used to study the impact of the Single 
Market on the periphery, in the context of the Community Support Framework of 
regional investment aid (Barry et al, 1996).
Crucial to the HERMIN approach is the three-way disaggregation of private 
sector production, into manufacturing, market services and agriculture. Ideally 
one would have liked to model the disaggregation of the non-agricultural sector 
into traded and non-traded activities, but this was not possible with existing data 
sources. Clearly the process on opening to the world economy, advanced in 
Ireland’s case, but less so for the Southern periphery, is forcing change initially in 
the traded sector. Inefficient industries, previously protected by tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, are in decline and are being replaced by a mixture of 
multinational branch plants and by more efficient indigenous firms. Consequently, 
the ability to pass through domestic cost inflation to producer prices is declining 
in the traded sector, and, based on Ireland's experience, will eventually vanish 
completely. In addition, the production technology will move progressively from 
a Cobb-Douglas type, where the blue-print is responsive to domestic relative 
factor prices, to a more Leontief type, where the blue-print is designed abroad. 
Such considerations as these were at the centre of the exploration of the impacts 




























































































In addition, the market service sector is undergoing a transition, initially providing 
consumer services, but gradually changing to a greater provision of producer 
services, the containment of whose costs is a crucial element in the competitive 
success of the exposed traded sector.
Finally, the HERMIN models provide a bridge between macro-stabilisation and 
macro-growth analysis. This permits one to investigate the supply-side 
consequences of policy initiatives like the CSF, that were largely ignored in the 
QUEST analysis described above. Results for Ireland illustrate the beneficial 
consequences on infrastructural and human resource shocks that occur as 
externalities, and produce permanent benefits to the periphery [Bradley, Whelan 
and Wright (1993)].
We now provide a summary overview of the structure and properties of the four 
HERMIN models of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, focusing on similarities 
and differences between the structures of the various peripheral countries. Our 
summary is brief, since more detailed descriptions of earlier versions of three of 
the models are available elsewhere (Bradley, Herce and Modesto, 1995).29
5.1 The HERMIN models: an overview
Each national HERMIN model consists of three broad subcomponents: a supply- 
side, an absorption side and an income distribution side. Obviously, the models 
function as integrated systems of equations, with interrelationships between all 
their subcomponents. However, for expositional purposes we describe the 
HERMIN modelling framework in terms of the above three subcomponents, 
which are schematically illustrated in Figure 5.1 below.
Conventional Keynesian mechanisms are at the core of the HERMIN model. 
Thus, the absorption and income distribution subcomponents (shown in Figure 
5.1) generate the standard income-expenditure mechanisms of the model. 
However, the model also has neo-classical features, mainly associated with the 
supply subcomponent (illustrated in Figure 5.1). Thus, output in manufacturing is 
not simply driven by demand. It is also influenced by price and cost 
competitiveness, where firms seek out minimum cost locations for production 
(Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988). In addition, factor demands in manufacturing 
and market services are derived using a CES production function, where the 
capital/labour ratio is sensitive to relative factor prices. The incorporation of a 
structural Phillips curve mechanism in the wage bargaining mechanism introduces
2,The HERMIN model for Greece was newly constructed by the Irish team, in conjunction 




























































































further relative price effects. Finally, in the Irish model labour migration is 
sensitive to relative labour market conditions in Ireland and Britain.
5.2 The supply block of HERMES
Basically this block concerns the determination of output, factor inputs, output 
prices and factor prices for the four-way sectoral disaggregation of GDP into 
manufacturing (T), market services (N), agriculture (A) and government (G).
Manufacturing sector 
Manufacturing output (OT)
A standard form of manufacturing output equation (OT) is specified for each of 
the four models. This takes the form
log (OT) =a, + a2 log(OW) + a , log (ULCT /  POT)
+a4 \og(FDOT) + a, log( POT / PWORLD) + a ,t
where OW is ‘world’ manufacturing output, ULCT is unit labour costs, POT is 
the output price, FDOT is a measure of domestic demand weighted by 





























































































Figure 5.1: The HERMIN Model Schematic
Supply Aspects
Manufacturing Sector
Output = f\( World Demand, Domestic Demand, Competitiveness, t) 
Employment = f i(  Output, Relative Factor Prices, t)
Investment = f (  Output, Relative Factor Prices, t)
Capital Stock = Investment + (1-8) Capital Stock,\
Output Price = fEW orld Price * Exchange Rate, Unit Labour Costs) 
Wage Rate = / 5( Output Price, Tax Wedge, Unemployment, Productivity) 
Competitiveness = National/World Relative Production Cost and Prices
Service Sector
Output = f i t  Weighted Domestic Demand, World Demand)
Employment = / gf Output, Relative Factor Prices, t)
Investment = f>( Output, Relative Factor Prices, t)
Capital Stock = Investment + (I-d)Capital Stocky
Output Price = Mark-Up On Labour Costs
Wage Inflation = Manufacturing Sector Wage Inflation
Demographics and Labour Supply
Population Growth = f\ \(  Natural Growth, Migration ) — (Ireland) 
Migration = fn (  National/EU Labour Market Conditions ) -  (Ireland) 
Labour Supply = fu (  Population, Replacement Ratio, Unemployment) 
Unemployment = Labour Supply - Labour Demand
Absorption Aspects
Consumption = f t4( Personal Disposable Income ) 
Net Trade Surplus = Output - Domestic Demand
Income Distribution
Income = Output
Personal Disposable Income = Income + Transfers - Direct Taxes 
Balance o f Payments = Net Trade Surplus + Net Factor Income From Abroad 
Public Sector Borrowing = Public Expenditure - Tax Rate * Tax Base 
Public Sector Debt = ( 1 + Interest Rate ) D e b t + Borrowing
Key Exogenous Variables
External: World output and prices; EU core labour market conditions; exchange rates; 
interest rates.




























































































In estimation the Irish and Spanish models appear as polar opposites. The small 
size and extreme openness of the Irish economy, and the dominant position 
occupied by branch plants of foreign-owned multinational firms, dictate a 
particular form of manufacturing output determination, with consequences for the 
behaviour of manufactured exports. Domestic demand is found to play a 
relatively small part in the long-run decisions of Irish manufacturing firms, and 
output prices are almost completely determined abroad. Irish manufacturing 
output is driven primarily by world demand and cost competitiveness.
In the Spanish HERMIN model, on the other hand, manufactured output responds 
strongly to changes in both domestic demand and world demand conditions. 
Spanish prices are also more strongly affected by domestic costs, in contrast to 
the strong degree of externally determined pricing behaviour found for Irish 
manufacturing.
In Table 5.1 we show the estimated and imposed coefficients in the manufactured 
output equation for all four models. In estimation we impose certain restrictions 
on the relative size of the coefficients an and a4 (i.e., on the relative strengths of 
the world and domestic demand variables).30
Table 5.1: Coefficients on the OT equation
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
a2 0.25* 0.51 0.37 0.18
a3 -0.25* -0.31 -0.25* -0.20*
34 0.50* 0.26 0.74 0.54
3s -0.25* -0.34 -0.25* -0.20*
36 0.0096 0.036 - 0 .0 0 1 0.0095
*denotes imposed coefficient. 
Source: Own estimates
3CThus, we make the strong assumption that goods sold on the home market can be identified 
as non-tradables. This was done because for several of the countries the ratio (for the 
manufacturing sector) of goods exported to sales on the home market is very close to the 
weight of world demand in the manufacturing output equation relative to domestic demand (a 





























































































Factor demands in manufacturine (LT. IT)
Since the Cobb-Douglas production function is too restrictive, we use the CES 
form of the added value production function and impose it on both manufacturing 
(T) and market service (N) sectors:
In this equation, Q, L and K are added value, employment and the capital stock, 
respectively, A is a scale parameter, p is related to the constant elasticity of 
substitution, 8 is a factor intensity parameter, and Xk are the rates of technical 
progress embodied in labour and capital respectively.
In both the manufacturing and market service sectors, factor demands are derived 
on the basis of cost minimisation subject to given output, yielding a joint factor 
demand equation system of the form:3'
Here, w and c are the cost of labour and capital, respectively. Simple 
autoregressive expectational lags can be imposed by making actual factor 
demands a function of lagged values of the driving variables.
Although the central factor demand systems in the manufacturing and market 
service sectors are functionally identical, together with their ancillary identities, 
they will have different estimated parameter values and other crucial differences. 
For example, in the Irish case a fraction of manufacturing sector profits is 
repatriated through the balance of payments, mirroring the known behaviour of 
multinational firms that dominate the Irish manufacturing sector. This profit 
repatriation mechanism is not yet included in the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish 
models, where the role of multinationals is considerably smaller as a share of total 
manufacturing activity. No such mechanism is included in the market service 
sector, where distributed profits simply go directly into private income.
51A profit maximisation approach, used in a eariier version of the Portuguese model, leads to 
essentially the same empirical formulation of factor demands, although has different 
implications for output determination. In all models we have standardised on the cost 
minimization approach.




























































































Focusing first on production functions, we summarise below the elasticities of 
substitution between capital and labour in the manufacturing sector. The main 
finding (shown in Table 5.2) that comes through is the fact that the Irish elasticity 
Table 5.2: Elasticities of substitution in manufacturing sector production 
functions
Ireland Portugal (and Greece) Spain
0.34 0.88 0.77
Source: Own estimates____________________________________________________________
is much smaller than those for Portugal and Spain.32
The smaller elasticity for Ireland can be understood as follows. In a traditional 
and/or relatively closed economy, the substitution of capital for labour as a result 
of shifting relative factor prices normally takes place within the economy. 
However, in an economy dominated by multinationals, this substitution will often 
involve a shift in production capacity to other countries (i.e. capital will not 
replace labour in the Irish factory but will instead seek out lower costs 
elsewhere). Due to difficulties with the Greek estimation, we have imposed the 
Portuguese elasticity of substitution, but estimated the other CES parameters 
freely from the data.
A note on the role that the production function plays in the model is necessary. 
Macroeconometric models can feature production functions of the form:
Q = f ( K , L )
without output being determined by this relationship. We have seen above that 
manufacturing output is determined in HERMIN by a mixture of world and 
domestic demand, together with price and cost competitiveness terms. Having 
determined output in this way, the role of the CES production function is to 
constrain the determination of factor demands in the process of cost minimisation 
that is assumed. Hence, given Q (determined however), and given (exogenous) 
relative factor prices, the factor inputs, L and K, are determined by the CES 
constraint. Hence, the production function operates in the model as a technology 
constraint and is only indirectly involved in the determination of output. In later 
chapters we will see that it is partially through these interrelated factor demands 
that the longer run efficiency enhancing effects of the SEM and the CSF are held 
to operate.




























































































The price of manufacturing output (POT)
Output prices in the manufacturing sector are determined as a mixture of price 
taking (PWORLD) and a mark-up on unit labour costs (ULCT).
log (POT) = a t +a2 \og(PWORLD) + (1 -  a2) log (ULCT)
Ireland stands out as a more extreme case of price-taking, with an elasticity of
0. 80 on PWORLD. Greece has a value of 0.70 and Portugal 0.62. Spain is 
lowest, with a value of 0.41. In every case price homogeneity was imposed, 
ensuring that the mark-up elasticity was one minus the price-taking elasticity.
Average annual earnings in manufacturing (WT)
The behaviour of the industrial sector tends to be dominant in the area of wage 
determination. Wage rates are modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process 
that takes place between well-organised trades unions and employers, with the 
frequent intervention of the government. Formalised theory of wage bargaining 
points to four paramount explanatory variables (Layard, Nickell and Jackman , 
1990):
1. Output prices (POT)
ii. The tax wedge (WEDGE)
iii. The rate of unemployment (UR)
iv. Labour productivity (LPRT)
The form of manufacturing wage equation estimated for the Irish and Spanish 
models is as follows:
log(WT) = a ] +a 2 log(POT) + a 3 log(WEDGE) + a 4 log(LPRT)  + a$UR
This equation could also be written in rate-of-change form, and the issue of 
hysteresis explored through using the level and change in UR in the Phillips curve 
term. Wages in the Greek and Portuguese models are determined in a slightly 
simpler way and use the consumption deflator (incorporating only an indirect tax 
wedge), as follows:
log(VVT) = af + a2 log(PC) + a3 log( LPRT) + aJJR
In all cases we imposed full price indexation, which was not rejected by the data 
in the case of Ireland and Portugal. In the case of Spain we believed that anything 
less than full price indexation would complicate the interpretation of the long-run 
simulation analysis that is required for SEM and CSF investigations. While 




























































































productivity, they tend to show full indexation to prices in the long run (Dreze 
and Bean, 1990). We failed to estimate sensible equations for wage setting in 
Greek manufacturing and were forced to impose the following properties: full 
indexation to consumer prices; full pass-through of labour productivity; and a 
Phillips curve effect that is the same as in the case of Portugal.
It is in the impact of unemployment on wage demands (the ‘Phillips Curve’ 
effect) that the four wage equations differ most. We show below in Table 5.3, the 
effects on the wage rate of a one percentage point rise in the rate of 
unemployment. It is clear that wage bargaining in the manufacturing sector is 
least influenced by the level of unemployment in the Spanish case. The Phillips 
curve parameters are very similar in the cases of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
However, the labour supply in HERMIN is exogenous in the cases of Greece and 
Portugal. Hence, deviations of unemployment from a baseline can only be 
removed through changes in the demand for labour. For Ireland, on the other 
hand, the labour supply is highly elastic, due to the presence of an 
unemployment-sensitive migration mechanism in the Irish model. This will serve 
to drive any deviations of the Irish unemployment rate to zero in the medium 
term, as the British-Irish equilibrium is re-established. Hence, the long-run 
effective role of the Phillips curve mechanism is very diminished in the Irish 
model.






“Percentage change in wages resulting from 1 percentage point rise in unemployment 
Source: Own estimations
Market services
Output in market services (ON)
Once again, a standard form of the service sector output equation (ON) is 
specified for all four models. Initially this was in double log form:




























































































where IH is housing investment, IBC is other building and construction 
investment, FON is a measure of domestic demand weighted of services output 
content and OW is world manufacturing. We separate out the building and 
construction investment from the other components of domestic demand since 
this element has a large weight in determining output in the service sector 
(remember, building and construction activity is included in the market services 
sector (N)).
Factor demands in market services (LN, INI
A CES production function is also used in the market service (or N-sector) for 
each model. We summarise below the elasticities of substitution between capital 
and labour in the market service sector. The main finding that comes through is 
the fact that the Irish elasticity is much smaller than those for Portugal and 
Spain.33
Table 5.4: Elasticities of substitution in market services production functions
Ireland Greece and Portugal Spain
0.20 0.70 0.51
Source: Own estimations
Market services output price (PON1
Market services output prices (PON) are determined as a mark-up on unit labour 
costs (ULCN) in all four models. However, in Portugal, there is a small world 
price-taking element, with an elasticity less than 0.20.
Average annual earnings in market services (WN)
Visual inspection indicated that the sectoral wage inflation rates in manufacturing 
and market services were almost identical. So we invoke labour market 
homogeneity, as in the Scandinavian model of Lindbeck, 1979, and pass on the 
manufacturing-sector wage inflation to the market service and government 
sectors. This assumption seems to fit all countries reasonably well, even if it is a 
gross simplification of the real world situation.





























































































The agriculture sector is treated exogenously in all four models. Basically, output 
(OA), employment (LA), and the capital stock (KA) are modelled as time trends. 
Output prices are exogenously determined within the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP).
Government sector: output and employment
Public sector employment and investment are exogenous instruments. GDP 
arising in the public sector is set equal to the real and nominal wage bill, plus a 
real and nominal non-wage residual. Further details of taxation and expenditure 
are given in Barry et al 1996.
Labour supply
In the case of Ireland, the supply of labour by households is modelled carefully in 
order to take into account the known open properties of the Irish labour market. 
Population of working age is driven by an exogenous ‘natural’ growth rate, 
modified by migration outflows and inflows. The participation rate is influenced 
by unemployment (the discouraged worker effect) and the replacement ratio (i.e., 
the fraction of average earnings replaced by social welfare transfers) (Newell and 
Symons, 1990). International migration is driven by relative expected earnings 
and employment probabilities between Ireland and Britain (Walsh, 1974).
Unfortunately, estimation of the crucial migration relationship is not very robust, 
due to the poor quality of the inter-censal estimated data on new migration flows. 
However, the migration mechanism in the Irish model is quite unique among 
macroeconometric models in the EU, and, for example, no other European 
macromodel treats migration endogenously. The performance of the Irish labour 
market is crucially dependent on the migration outlet as a means of providing 
employment for excess Irish population in world (mainly British) labour markets.
With respect to labour supply, the Irish and Greek/Portuguese models are also 
polar extremes, with the labour supply exogenous in the Portuguese and Greek 
models and both endogenous and highly elastic (because of the migration links 
between Ireland and the UK) in the Irish case. The Spanish model permits some 
endogeneity to enter via discouraged worker effects in the male and female labour 
force participation decisions. Consequently, in the Portuguese and Greek models 
there is a one-to-one relationship between employment and unemployment: at the 
margin, a job created means one less unemployed person. Once again however, 
one could argue that the Portuguese model may become more similar to the Irish 
case as the Portuguese labour market integrates with labour markets in the 
European core economies. Alternatively, the labour supply may already be quite 




























































































kind). This obviously is an area where further research is needed, given the 
importance of the Phillips curve effects in all the HERMIN model simulations.
5.3 The absorption block of HERMIN
Private consumption
In the standard version of HERMIN, the determination of household consumption 
is quite simple and orthodox. Private consumption is related to real personal 
disposable income. In practice consumers in the periphery are found to be mainly 
liquidity constrained, a fact that is not surprising in light of the less sophisticated 
financial sectors in these countries.34
The estimation results for the simple liquidity constrained consumption functions 
were as follows:
Table 5.5: Long run marginal propensity to consume
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
MPC 0.790 0.800 0.826 0.882
Source: own estimations
Net trade surplus
Drawing on the theory on regional and small open economy macromodels, 
exports and imports are not modelled separately in the HERMIN models. Rather, 
the net trade surplus, in current and constant prices, is determined as a residual by 
subtracting domestic demand from output. Thus, in current prices,
NTSV = GDPMV - (CONSV + GV + IV + DSV)
and in constant prices,
NTS = GDPM - (CONS + G + I + DS)
14We experimented with a hybrid liquidity constrained and permanent income models of 
consumption, using the Irish model as a test case, and found that the properties of the model 
were relatively invariant to the choice between a hybrid and a pure liquidity constrained 
function. Of course, if a forward looking model of wage income were used, the properties of 




























































































where GDPM(V) denotes GDP at constant (current) market prices; CONS(V) is 
private consumption, G(V) is public consumption, I(V) is investment, and DS(V) 
are inventory changes.
Hence, the HERMIN models can say nothing about the separate behaviour of 
exports and imports. Only the impact on the net trade surplus can be examined.
5.4 The income distribution block of HERMIN
With a view to subsequent policy analysis, HERMIN includes a moderate degree 
of institutional detail in the public sector along conventional lines. Within total 
public expenditure we distinguish public consumption (mainly wages of public 
sector employees), transfers (social welfare, subsidies, debt interest payments), 
and capital expenditure (public housing, infrastructure, investment grants to 
industry).
At present, there is effectively no monetary sector in HERMIN, so both the 
exchange rate and domestic interest rates are treated as exogenous. Thus, the 
nominal ‘anchor’ in each model is the world price in foreign currency. In effect, 
by treating exchange rates and interest rates as exogenous in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain we are positing a future process of EMU-type financial integration 
rather than modelling their actual past behaviour.
5.5 How the models react to exogenous shocks
In all four models an attempt has been made to carry out comparable shocks to 
observe how each model reacts. We briefly review the responses of each model 
to two shocks that serve to illustrate certain mechanisms that are central to the 
subsequent analysis of the SEM and the CSF (see Bradley et al, 1995 and Barry 
et al, 1996 for further material on shocks). These shocks originate from the year 
1990, and are carried out against the background of a baseline projection that 
runs from 1987 to 2010. The baseline is not intended to be a formal forecast of 
the likely evolution of these four economies. Rather, it is a conjectural projection 
that has reasonably stable properties (i.e. stable public debt/GDP ratio, stable or 
declining rate of unemployment, etc.). In effect the models are reasonably linear 
in behaviour, so the magnitudes of partial derivatives with respect to exogenous 
variables are relatively invariant to the actual level of the baseline.
The two shocks we present relate to the influence of world demand and public 
sector employment. The response of each model to a stimulus in world activity 
(specifically, to world manufacturing output, OW) is important when analysing 





























































































sector employment (LG) permits the evaluation of standard fiscal multipliers both 
in the case of debt financing and in the case of tax financing.
The impact o f world manufacturing activity (OW)
The results are shown in Table 5.6. The Irish results stand out in this table in that 
the manufacturing sector responds strongly to the world demand boost. This 
arises from the form of the manufacturing output equation, where there is a higher 
elasticity with respect to OW than is the case in the other three models. The least 
responsive models are the Greek and Spanish, where once again this is merely 
reflecting the characteristics of the country coefficients of the manufacturing 
output equation. Since domestic demand plays a greater role in the Southern 
periphery models, the service sector responds relatively more strongly than in the 
Irish case to secondary effects of a rise in manufacturing output. In addition, the 
direct impact of changes in OW is greatest in the case of Greece (i.e., the 





























































































Table 5.6: World demand shock: 1% of 1989 figure1
Year 1990 1991 1995 2000 2010
Greece
% dif. in OT 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.24
% dif. in ON 0.34 0.40 0.48 0.52 0.59
% dif. in GDPFC 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.37
Ireland
%  dif. in OT 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.55
(0.50) (0.47) (0.52) (0.58) (0.63)
% dif. in ON 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.37
(0.23) (0.28) (0.31) (0.35) (0.43)
% dif. in GDPFC 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.39
(0.26) (0.28) (0.32) (0.37) (0.44)
Portugal
% dif. in OT 0.37 0.36 0.42 0.44 0.48
% dif. in ON 0.19 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.52
% dif. in GDPFC 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.34
Spain
%  dif. in OT 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26
(0.23) (0.27) (0.34) (0.43) (0.50)
%  dif. in ON 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.32
(0.18) (0.23) (0.29) (0.38) (0.48)
% dif. in GDPFC 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.25
(0.16) (0.20) (0.25) (0.32) (0.40)
1 all differences are from national baseline scenario
Le pen OT Output in the traded sector (constant prices)
d:
ON Output in the non traded sector (constant prices)
GDPF Gross domestic product at factor cost (constant prices) 
C
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate simulations where the fiscal policy rule (to 
target RDEBT) was switched on (refer to Section 5.3)_______________
The impact o f an increase in government employment (LG)
The results are shown in Table 5.7. In each case we have permanently raised 
public employment numbers by 5% of their 1989 baseline value. Table 5.7 shows 
both the case where no attempt is made to finance the increased public 
expenditure by raising taxes and the case where a policy feed-back rule is used to 
attempt to prevent deviations in the national debt to GDP ratio from its baseline 
values.35
35The policy feedback rule endogenises the direct tax rate and uses it to reduce deviations in 




























































































We calculate a multiplier by taking the ratio of the rise in real GDP (relative to 
the baseline) to the increase in public consumption (in real terms, relative to the 
baseline). For all four models the long run fiscal multipliers are quite high in the 
policy unconstrained case, ranging from about 1.5 for Ireland to about 2 for 
Greece. In this case, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal it is seen that there is a 
serious deterioration in the fiscal position (i.e. a rise of about ten percentage 
points in the debt/GDP ratio).
Table 5.7: Public sector employment shock: 5% of 1989 figure1























Multiplier 1.18 1.41 1.40 1.43 1.50
(1.10) (1.24) (0.86) (0.46) (0.08)
dif. in RDEBT -1.19 -1.40 1.56 4.72 9.90
(-1.27) (-1.65) (0.06) (0.57) (-0.58)
Portugal
Multiplier 1.02 1.22 1.55 1.64 1.91
(0.96) (1.05) (0.94) (0.68) (0.75)
dif. in RDEBT -0.06 0.14 2.72 5.97 11.44
(-0.31) (-0.21) O H )______ (2.61) (2.76)
Spain
Multiplier 1.27 1.66 1.51 1.52 1.53
(1.14) (1.39) (0.85) (0.50) (0.42)
dif. in RDEBT -0.13 -0.08 0.67 1.73 4.15
(-0.20) (-0.32) (-0.53) (-1.17) (-2.26)
1 all differences are from national baseline scenario
Legend: The multiplier is calculated as dif(GDPE)/dif(G) where differences are taken 
relative to the no-shock baseline. GDPE is gross domestic expenditure (at 
constant prices) and G is public consumption (at constant prices)
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate simulations where the fiscal policy rule (to target
RDEBT) was switched on (refer to Section 5.3)_____________________________
In the policy constrained case, shown in brackets in Table 5.7, the policy feed­
back rule is endogenised to attempt to moderate the rise in the debt/GDP ratio 
over its baseline. The rule is not perfect, but it is reasonably successful in 
controlling deviations in the debt/GDP ratio. The fiscal multipliers are drastically 




























































































greatest in the case of Greece, where they become negative towards the end of 
the simulation period. In the case of Ireland the multiplier falls eventually to zero, 
indicating that the balanced budget multiplier is zero in the medium to long term.
5.6 Overall perspective on the HERMIN models
In the Irish case the HERMIN model reflects an economy whose manufacturing 
sector reacts rather rapidly to movements in world demand, indicating the close 
supply-side links with foreign multinational activity. The somewhat limited role 
for domestic fiscal expansion is reflected in the fiscal multipliers, which are 
effectively zero in the balanced budget case when the national debt is capped.
In the Greek and Portuguese cases the HERMIN model reflects economies that 
are only partially exposed to international competition. Increases in world 
demand bring only limited increases in domestic production, reflecting the more 
traditional nature of their exports and the predominance of imports of finished 
goods. The fiscal multipliers also appear to be relatively large, though they 
probably characterise an era that has now passed, when Portugal and Greece 
were relatively insulated from world economic forces. We suspect that both these 
economies may become much more like the Irish case in future years.
The Spanish results are interesting. Our prior was that Spain would behave as a 
semi-closed economy, given its large size relative to Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. This is partially borne out in the world output shock. However, the 
fiscal multipliers were found to be rather smaller than expected. The institutional 
rigidities of the labour market, captured in a stylised way by the very small 
Phillips curve parameter in the wage bargaining equation, appear to be 
responsible for this, but the matter clearly merits further research and 
investigation36.
6. The White Paper and Peripheral Development
We turn now to the longer-term developmental policy aspects of the White Paper. 
These have been succinctly summarised in terms of the following four overriding 
objectives (pp. 58-59):
i. helping European firms to adapt to the new globalised and interdependent 
competitive situation
36ln Spain, collective bargaining agreements are legally enforcable and apply to all workers 




























































































ii. exploiting the competitive advantages associated with the gradual shift to a 
knowledge-based economy
iii. promoting a sustainable development of industry, and
iv. reducing the time-lag between the pace of change in supply and the 
corresponding adjustments in demand.
In each case there is a specifically peripheral perspective on these issues. We first 
treat the industrialisation and competitiveness aspects, examining the different 
states of evolution of, and choices facing, the four countries involved. Then we 
discuss how policies of investment in human resources and physical infrastructure 
are central to the process of development in the periphery, promoting greater 
integration into the EU and wider world economies.
6.1 Industrialisation and competitiveness
The proposal in the White Paper is to keep average real wage increases 1 
percentage point below the growth rate of productivity. It is well established that 
while the European economies tend to pass on almost all productivity increases to 
labour in the form of higher wages, measured productivity does not enter 
significantly in the U.S. wage equation [Dreze and Bean (1990)]. Consequently, 
the White Paper proposal would represent a modification of earlier practice in the 
EU, and would facilitate greater employment growth.
This pay guideline would be far too lax under the circumstances facing the 
periphery, for the following reason. Given the likelihood that productivity will 
continue to grow much faster in these countries, the guideline would be 
compatible with a substantially faster growth of real wage rates there than in the 
EU core.37 The resulting impact on employment overall would be unfavourable, 
however, because the pace of average productivity growth masks very different 
productivity performance across sectors.
For example, in Ireland productivity growth has come to be dominated by 
multinational enterprises with such high productivity levels and growth rates that 
the indigenous employment-intensive firms, which account for the bulk of total 
employment, could not hope to match them. For this reason, as well as the greater 
scale of the employment challenge facing the periphery, a more restrictive pay 
target would be needed to achieve the employment effects expected in other EU 
countries from the adoption of the Commissions guideline.
” ln Section 5 we drew attention to the high rate of technical progress in the periphery, with 




























































































This crowding-out process in Ireland can be regarded as a variant of the Dutch 
disease, from which Spain also has suffered. Both countries have experienced a 
considerable amount of restructuring and modernisation of activity which, 
because it was unevenly spread and concentrated primarily in less 
labour-intensive activities, led to a pricing out of low-productivity, 
labour-intensive activities [Bradley, Whelan and Wright (1993), pp. 41-43]. That 
Greece and Portugal have not experienced a similar situation may be a 
consequence of their low state of development, rather than that they have found 
satisfactory ways of dealing with the negative spill-overs of rapid modernisation. 
These problems, therefore, are still before them.
Policy makers in the Southern periphery face the following stark choice. Do they 
permit the fairly rapid destruction of their indigenous, inefficient, labour intensive, 
low wage sector, and facilitate its replacement by an efficient, capital (or R&D) 
intensive, high wage sector? As in the Irish and Spanish cases, this route appears 
likely to entail substantial structural unemployment and an associated high tax 
burden if social welfare systems are put in place. Alternatively, do the policy 
makers permit a dual labour market to develop, where, in the absence of a fully 
developed social welfare system, workers in the low productivity sectors have no 
choice but to accept low wages.38 In the Greek and Portuguese cases, this second 
route appears to entail a wide dispersion of wage rates, as between sectors and 
skill levels, and a degree of "working poverty".
One way of minimising the adverse side effects is to try to ensure that the general 
process of wage determination is not unduly influenced by high productivity 
growth emanating from a relatively small section of the economy (in terms of 
employment share). Another complementary approach would be to try to secure a 
more balanced spread of productivity growth; policy should focus on raising 
efficiency in lagging sectors, especially the non-traded goods sectors, where 
restrictive practices and restraints on competition tend to be more abundant. The 
general application of the range of policies recommended by the White Paper to 
reduce tax and other disincentives to the use of labour would also help.
To conclude on pay issues, the White Paper makes large claims for what could be 
achieved by a reduction in statutory charges equivalent to 1-2% of GDP. To the 
extent that insider power is important, care needs to be taken to prevent the 
benefits of such tax cuts simply accruing to insiders. Furthermore, it is not 
credible that the impact claimed could be achieved in the periphery as a result of
38In the Portuguese HERMIN model, the Phillips curve effect in the service sector is six times 
larger than the effect in manufacturing, illustrating that a dual labour market already exists 




























































































such a change. Statutory charges on labour are already much lower in the four 
peripheral states than in all other EU states with the exception of the UK. The 
White Paper's own figures are that while the EU average as a percent of GDP is 
23.5%, the ratio in Greece is 16.5%, Ireland 17.8%, Portugal 16.0%, and Spain 
20.4%.
Furthermore, an application by Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) of the HERMES 
model to simulate the effects in Ireland of a unilateral C 0 2 tax matched by a 
general cut in social insurance contributions, yielded an employment elasticity of 
under 0.4. A targeted cut of the kind recommended in the White Paper would 
undoubtedly yield more, but on the other hand in a multilateral application of the 
policy, Ireland's wage competitiveness would not improve relative to other EU 
countries. Obviously in the periphery, as elsewhere, tax policy should seek to 
remove needless disincentives to the take-up of low-paid employment, but such 
an approach cannot be regarded as reaching to the core of the underdevelopment 
problems of the periphery.
6.2 Human resources and physical infrastructure
The White Paper proposals on education and training are very relevant to the 
periphery. All four states emerge as below-average on various measures of human 
capital, such as the proportion of adolescents in education and training, or the 
ratio of research scientists and engineers per 1,000 of the labour force, with the 
lowest positions occupied by Greece and Portugal. The White Paper is also 
concerned about the uneven distribution of education and training resources, with 
those from deprived backgrounds likely to benefit least - a factor that is also 
significant in the periphery. The more difficult questions to determine, however, 
relate to what kinds of education and training are likely to be most effective, and 
how to ensure that they are of good quality [Grubb (1994)].
The White Paper recommendation that a significant proportion of expenditure on 
unemployment compensation be re-allocated to training, even if it were feasible, 
would have limited impact in Portugal and Greece. In Portugal, measured 
unemployment is quite low, while in Greece unemployment compensation is 
minimal, so that registered unemployment is much less than unemployment 
measured on a Labour Force Survey basis, and of course even the latter measure 
does not encapsulate the low participation rate and high degree of 
underemployment.
Besides lagging behind in terms of human capital, the peripheral regions, as noted 
earlier, also have inadequate levels of physical infrastructure. These problems of 




























































































structural adjustments that we have identified as being in store for Greece and 
Portugal, the burden of adjustment would be substantially eased were an adequate 
level of infrastructure already in place. Not only would this stimulate the inflow 
of multinational investment that these economies will require, it would also aid 
restructuring along the lines of traditional comparative advantage.
6.3 The New Development Model
Further developmental opportunities are suggested by the White Paper's "new 
development model" for the Community. A clear implication of this model is the 
need to discourage environmentally damaging concentrations of economic activity 
and to encourage dispersal of industrial location. Indeed the White Paper 
recognises that the internal relocation of economic activities will contribute to the 
most efficient exploitation of environmental resources inside the Community as 
well as to a reduction of the far too-high environmental pressure in some areas. 
However, the dynamics of the internal market, if allowed to operate unchecked, 
could exacerbate that position in some respects by facilitating even greater 
regional concentration of certain industries in existing highly developed areas.
This danger would be greater if the present structure of national industrial 
subsidies is not rationalised [C.E.C. (1992)]. These are used extensively in most 
member states and, measured in relation to employment, are often much higher in 
the richer countries than in the poorer countries. In total in the Community they 
amount to several times the level of Structural Fund support for the poorer 
countries. Some of these subsidies in the rich member states (e.g. to indigenous 
mining) may not adversely affect the poorer members: indeed they may reduce 
the competitiveness of the richer members! But others, such as support for mobile 
international firms, serve to substantially negate the development efforts of the 
poorer member states. Moreover they involve a huge windfall transfer to mobile 
international companies since the competing subsidies probably have more 
influence on the location than on the volume of such investment.
Only at Community level would it be possible to rationalise this position. Given 
the strong political interests involved, it would be naive to expect that appropriate 
regional policies will emerge at Community level simply because the intellectual 
case for them is reinforced. Nevertheless the new model does strengthen that 
case. It also elevates the perception of the regional issue, which is sometimes 
seen merely as a backdrop to pleas for hand-outs on the part of the periphery, to 





























































































In this paper we have argued that the labour-market problems of the periphery, in 
terms both of unemployment and underemployment, are substantially greater than 
those of the core EU economies. We identified a number of characteristics of 
peripheral regions that generate this outcome. Many of the factors that define 
"peripherality" also place extra burdens of adjustment on the labour market. 
Among these factors are the high share of employment in the declining 
agricultural sector, the excess sensitivity of peripheral industry to the international 
business cycle, the difficulties faced by labour abundant regions in adjusting to 
free trade, and the deficiencies in both physical and human capital infrastructure 
that magnify these difficulties considerably.
We argued that many econometric treatments of labour market issues are not 
designed to capture these factors. The Layard-Nickell-Jackman approach, in 
considering a single sector economy, not only glosses over the distinction 
between agriculture, industry and services, but also the structural differences 
between traditional and modem industry that are crucial now or soon will be in all 
of the peripheral regions. The Commission's QUEST model we found to be 
overly focused on demand-side issues, rather than the supply-side issues that 
dominate macroeconomic developments in the peripheral small open economies. 
These are the primary focus of the more recent HERMIN model constructed 
specifically for the EU periphery, but which is itself not without problems.
Just as the QUEST model is understandably designed with the more populous 
core regions in mind, so the specific recommendations in the Commission’s White 
Paper are more appropriate for the core than for the periphery. Since labour 
productivity in the latter regions will continue to converge to the levels applying 
elsewhere, employment and output growth targets there need to be considerably 
higher. The White Paper's recommendation on cuts in statutory charges on labour 
is unlikely to be sufficient to generate this employment growth. Nor is such 
growth likely to be aided in the short run by the fiscal contractions entailed by the 
Maastricht criteria.
What is ultimately required to overcome the factors generating peripherality? As 
the One Market, One Money report reveals, these factors are not primarily 
geographic. They are infrastructural. Adequate levels of human capital and 
physical infrastructure are required if industry in peripheral regions is to be able 
to compete internationally, and if the peripheral regions themselves are to be able 
to compete for the available flows of multinational investment. While these 
infrastructures are being put in place the periphery faces a stark choice. It may 




























































































entitlements, employment protection etc., or it may follow the "American model" 
of reliance on the free market. The former path is likely to hasten the demise of 
low productivity firms, and may result in high long-term unemployment rates, as 
in Spain and Ireland, while the latter path will, in the situation in which the 
periphery finds itself, lead to a worsening of the distribution of income, and the 
continuance of very low wage sectors in otherwise affluent economies.
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